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COMMENTS
The Selection Of Choice Of Law
Provisions In International Commercial
Arbitration: A Case For Contractual
Depeqage
I. INTRODUCTION
With the tremendous growth in international trade, international
commercial arbitration has become a frequently-used mechanism to set-
tle contractual disputes.1 There have been several traditional reasons
why parties opt for international arbitration instead of litigation in na-
tional courts. For one, arbitration may speed the resolution and lower
the expenses of disputes because it often avoids the delays associated
with court litigation.2 Parties who use arbitration also have the ability to
select factfinders with experience and competence in the particular busi-
ness area or the legal issues of the dispute Other benefits of arbitration
include the reduction of uncertainties and complexities that accompany
foreign litigation and the provision of a mowl neutral, convenient and
certain forum of dispute resolution.4 Of course, arbitration may involve
costs that litigation does not include;5 the expense of administrating the
1 REDFERN & HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 17 (1986); Kerr, InternationalArbitration v. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164, 164 (1980) (use of
arbitration clauses in international transactions is "almost universal").
2 Ehrenhaft, Effective International CommercialArbitration, 9 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1191,
1191 (1977) (litigation tends to be expensive and protracted); Danielowicz, The Choice of4pplicable
Law in InternationalArbitration, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 235, 236 (1986); Note, Gen-
eral Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1817
(1988).
3 Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 1193.
4 Danilowicz, supra note 2, at 236-7.
5 De Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National
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proceedings,6 the delays inherent in selecting arbitrators and scheduling
hearings,7 and the relatively lesser ability to implement discovery" are
not insignificant drawbacks of the process. In spite of these problems,
the practice of using arbitration to resolve international contractual dis-
putes is turning into an "almost universal" custom.9
One additional advantage of arbitration, the parties' ability to prede-
termine the law governing the resolution of the dispute, has gained grow-
ing recognition in recent years.10 This recognition, however, has been
myopic to some extent. Some commentators see choice of law options
confined either to the selection of one national legal system from several
possibilities" or to the selection of a single national, international, or
anational legal system.' 2 Such a self-imposed limitation of the applicable
law to one system of law often denies parties many of the benefits and
powers allowed them in international commercial arbitration. As an al-
ternative, an agreement may direct an arbitrator to apply different sys-
tems of law to different areas of the dispute.13
This Comment will present the benefits and limitations of this alter-
native, which may be described as contractual depegage.14 Through a
comparison of United States and German law, the first section will
demonstrate the advantages of a choice of law provision in an interna-
tional commercial arbitration agreement. Aa examination of the four
types of choice of law options in the second section will reveal how an
international arbitration that applies contractual depegage principles may
allow parties to maximize the benefits of choice of law provisions. The
final section discusses how the intervention of national judicial institu-
tions may entirely eliminate these benefits.
Courts, 57 TuL. L. REv. 42, 61 (1982); Higgins, Brown and Roach, Pitfalls in International Com-
mercial Arbitration, 35 Bus. LAw. 1035, 1038 (1980); Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 193.
6 Kerr, supra note 1, at 176; De Vries, supra note 5, at 61; Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 1194.
7 Kerr, supra note 1, at 176; Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 1194.
8 Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 1193.
9 Kerr, supra note 1, at 164.
10 See Branson & Wallace, Choosing the Substantive Law to Apply in International Commercial
Arbitration, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 39, 39 (1986); DELAumn, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL
CoNTRACTS 4 (1988); Note, supra note 2, at 1817.
11 See Branson & Wallace, supra note 10, at 39-42.
12 See YArES, Arbitration or Court Litigation for Private International Dispute Resolutior The
Lesser of TWo Evils, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION 233 (1. Carbonneau ed. 1982); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 72-3; Danielowicz,
supra note 2, at 237.
13 See DELAUME, supra note 10, at 9.
14 "Depegage can be defined broadly to cover all situations where the rules of different states are
applied to govern different issues in the same case." Reese, Depegag: A Common Phenomenon in
Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. Rv. 58, 58 (1973).
Choice of Law Provisions in Int'l Commercial Arbitration
12:163(1991)
II. IMPORTANCE OF THE CHOICE OF LAW
A. The Outcome Determinative Quality of the Choice of Law
From the onset, it is important to note that an arbitrator might not
limit the application of a transnational contract's choice of law clause
only to situations where the substance of the contract is in dispute.15 In
arbitration, the chosen law may affect decisions concerning the hearings'
procedure 16 or the agreement to arbitrate itself.17 As a consequence, par-
ties have much potential influence over the process and the product of an
international commercial arbitration.
The best way to illustrate the significant outcome-determinative
quality of choice of law provisions is to select two different systems of
law and demonstrate how each would lead to different results in an arbi-
tral setting, given certain factual problems and circumstances. Thus, the
following sections will contrast the resolution of issues pertaining to the
substance of the contract, the procedures of the arbitration, and the
agreement to arbitrate under the legal systems of two nations heavily
involved in international commerce: the United States and Germany."8
L Substance of the Contract
By far the most important aspect of a choice of law provision is its
effect on the resolution of disputes over the substance of the contract.
The result of an arbitration, given a fixed set of facts, may entirely hinge
upon which rule or rules the arbitrator applies. In such a case, the par-
ties truly can dictate the outcome of arbitration by indicating in advance
what rules will cover questions of contract validity and enforcement. A
choice between two nations' laws thus can become a choice of which
party will be victorious at arbitration.
a. Validity of the Contract
EXAMPLE (1): Widgetco, a firm based in the United States, agrees
15 Danilowicz, supra note 2, at 237; Branson & Wallace, supra note 10, at 44.
16 Branson & Wallace, supra note 10, at 45; Danilowicz, supra note 2, at 237.
17 Daniowicz, supra note 2, at 237; see Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, Art. V(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 220
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
18 The reference to the United States' "legal system" is misleading to some extent. The use of
the term implies that there is a single set of contract principles applicable in the United States. There
are, however, 50 separate state jurisdictions that establish their own contract laws. For the sake of
clarity, this Comment discusses legal principles that are essentially consistent among the jurisdic-
tions, and it will refer to these principles as "United States law." The Federal Republic of Ger-
many, on the other hand, maintains a unified law of contracts; thus, the same type of terminology
difficulties does not develop.
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to manufacture a given number of widgets for Consumerco, a German
company, and deliver them by the end of the year. Because of the diffi-
culty of obtaining alternative sources of widgets, Consumerco requires
Widgetco to promise to pay Consumerco 50% of the contract price as a
"penalty" if Widgetco fails to deliver. The amount of the penalty was
clearly designed to deter Widgetco from breaching its obligation and was
not calculated to represent liquidated damages. Later, Widgetco finds a
higher bidder for the widgets and defaults. Issue: Is the agreement to
pay the default penalty valid?
The answer to the dispute depends upon which system of law a
court or arbitrator applies. Since the rule in the United States concern-
ing the validity of penalty clauses is the opposite of that in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Consumerco's success in collecting the penalty
hinges on the chosen law.
In the United States, both statutory and common law prohibit the
enforcement of agreements for the payment of penalties upon breaches of
contract.19 To be enforceable, a predetermined payment due upon de-
fault must be a reasonable estimate of damages that are difficult or im-
possible to ascertain prior to the breach; otherwise, the payment is
considered a penalty and will not be valid.2' Some courts additionally
require a showing that the parties intended the payment to be liquidated
damages in order to enforce the promise.21
A court in the United States would find Example (1) to involve a
penalty.22 In Samson Sales, Inc v. Honeywell, Inc. ,23 defendant agreed
to pay plaintiff a specified sum in case defendant's security system failed
to operate properly. The court held that this sum represented a penalty
since the damages would have been easy to estimate through a valuation
of the goods to be protected.24 Similarly, the parties in Example (1)
would have also been able to easily forecast the damages caused by a
breach since both the price of widgets under the contract and the prevail-
ing market price would be easy to determine. 25 Thus, Widgetco would
19 U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1977); Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 12 Ohio St. 3d 27, 28, 465
N.E.2d 392, 394 (1984); Southeastern Land Fund, Inc. v. Real Estate World, Inc., 237 Ga. 227, 228,
227 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1976); Kealy v. Harter, 682 F.2d 198, 200 (8th Cir. 1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 356.
20 Samson Sales, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 28, 465 N.E.2d at 394; Southeastern, 237 Ga. at 230, 227
S.E.2d at 343; Kealy, 682 F.2d at 200.
21 Southeastern, 237 Ga. at 230, 227 S.E.2d at 343; Kealy, 682 F.2d at 200.
22 See Samson Sales, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 29, 465 N.E.2d at 394; Southeastern, 237 Ga. at 230, 227
S.E.2d at 343; Kealy, 682 F.2d at 200.
23 12 Ohio St. 3d 27, 465 N.E.2d 392 (1984).
24 Id. at 29, 465 N.E.2d at 394.
25 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the restitution damages for Widgeteo's breach would
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not have to pay the penalty sum if United States law were applied to the
case.
In contrast, the general rule in Germany is that a defaulting party
must pay any penalty to which it agreed in the contract.26 This rule, of
course, is not unlimited. If a court finds that the amount of the penalty is
unreasonably high, it may reduce the penalty to a reasonable level.
27
Thus, a German court would have to enforce a promise by one party to
pay a penalty to another in the event of a breach.2"
The penalty in Example (1) would clearly be enforceable under Ger-
man law.29 In a 1974 decision, the Bundesgerichtshof (German high
court) allowed a jukebox distributor to collect a 2,000 DM penalty for
which her contract with a defaulting tavern owner provided.30 Likewise,
German law would require Widgetco to pay its contractual penalty upon
its default31 although a court might reduce the amount.3 2 In sum, an
arbitrator or court would reach contrasting decisions regarding the valid-
ity of the penalty provision depending on whether it was bound by Ger-
man or United States law.
b. Performance of the Contract
EXAMPLE (2): Yankeecorp, an American firm, agrees to sell and
export widgets to Tehranco, an Iranian firm. After several months of
untroubled performance, an Islamic revolution occurs in Iran and
causes, among other things, changes in laws and disruption of normal
commerce, making further performance of the contract impracticable.
Issue: What relief is available to the parties?
The United States and German systems of law require two different
be "the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price." U.C.C. § 2-713 (1977).
26 BGB § 339; Judgment of November 27, 1974, Bundesgerichtshof, Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift 1975, 163. BGB § 339 reads in part: "If the [obligor] promises the [obligee] the payment of a
sum of money as a penalty in case he does not perform his obligation or does not perform it in the
proper manner, the penalty is forfeit if he is in default... ." Translation from FORRESrER, GOREN
AND ILGEN, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 55 (1975).
27 BGB § 343. This code section reads in part: "(1) If a penalty which is due is disproportion-
ately high, it may be reduced to a reasonable amount by court decision on the application of the
[obligor]. In the determination of reasonableness every legitimate interest of the [obligee], not
merely his property interest, shall be taken into consideration." Translation from FORRESTER,
GOREN AND ILGEN, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 56 (1975).




31 BGB § 339.
32 BGB § 343.
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resolutions to the situation in Example (2). In the United States, the
doctrine of commercial impracticability 3 would allow a court or arbitra-
tor to excuse performance by both parties.34 In order to be excused from
performance under the doctrine, a party must demonstrate that a contin-
gency has occurred to make performance impracticable and that the oc-
currence of the contingency was a "basic assumption" on which the
contract was made.35  "The relevant inquiry is whether the risk of the
occurrence of the contingency was so unusual or unforeseen and the con-
sequences of the occurrence of the contingency so severe that to require
performance is to grant the buyer an advantage he did not bargain for in
the contract."
36
The exporter in Example (2) could easily meet these requirements.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,37 Iran sued a
United States defense manufacturer for damages resulting from the firm's
failure to provide replacement parts as called for by the contract. Be-
cause of the political turmoil that developed from the Iranian Revolution
and the subsequent export prohibitions that the United States imposed,
the court found that it was "commercially impracticable" for the defense
manufacturer to deliver the parts to Iran,38 and it therefore released the
firm from its obligation to perform.39
A court or arbitrator would resolve the above example in a different
way if it had to apply German law. Through the German Civil Code
provision that requires contracting parties to deal in good faith," the
33 "Although impossibility or impracticability of performance may arise in many different ways,
the tendency has been to classify the cases into several categories. These are: 1) Destruction, deterio-
ration or unavailability of the subject matter or the tangible means of performance; 2) Failure of the
contemplated mode of delivery or payment; 3) Supervening prohibition or prevention by law; 4)
Failure of the intangible means of performance and 5) Death or illness." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoN-
ARY 680 (5th ed. 1979).
34 U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1977); Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Engineers, Inc., 775 F.2d 781, 786 (7th
Cir. 1984); Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976); Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1975). U.C.C. § 2-615(a) reads in
part: "Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller.. .is not a breach of his duty
under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of
a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made
or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid."
35 Waldinger, 775 F.2d at 786; Nora Springs, 247 N.W.2d at 748; Eastern Air Lines, 415 F.
Supp. at 438.
36 Waldinger, 775 F.2d at 786 (citation omitted).
37 591 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1985).
38 Id. at 299.
39 Id.
40 BGB § 242. The text of this section reads: "The [obligor] is bound to effect performance
according to the requirements of good faith, giving consideration to common usage." Translation
from FORRESTER, GOREN AND ILGEN, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 41 (1975).
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German high courts have developed the doctrine of Geschdftsgrundlage
(foundation of the transaction) that deals with matters of impossibility,
commercial impracticability, and frustration of contract.4 ' The doctrine
essentially allows a court to "adjust" (anpassen) the terms of a contract42
in the event that the "foundation" of the agreement has been severely
impaired or destroyed, regardless of cause.43 Consequently, a court may
equalize the position of the parties and compensate for the disruptions
caused by the unforeseen event.'
In practice, this doctrine would solve Example (2)'s performance
problem in a manner quite different from its counterpart in the United
States. In one case45, the Bundesgerichtshof encountered a dispute where
an Iranian import firm was unable to further perform its contract with a
German beer distributor because of the newly-formed Iranian govern-
ment's prohibition of the sale of alcohol. The court determined that this
new law rendered the Iranian firm's performance impossible, destroyed
the foundations of the contract, and therefore required the excuse of both
parties' further performance.' As a result, however, the two parties had
to jointly bear the loss of this change, and the German brewery had to
partially repay the Iranian firm for the beer that was delivered but not
sold.47 Example (2) almost exactly parallels the circumstances of this
case and would most likely lead to a similar resolution of the dispute if
German law applied.4"
In sum, the laws of Germany and the United States present different
methods of resolving performance difficulties. While a United States
court would excuse performance without taking subsequent losses into
account, a German court would ensure that the parties would jointly
bear resulting losses in an equitable manner.
These two examples demonstrate how the systems of law in the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany confront issues of
contractual validity and performance with varying approaches. Given
these differences, the outcome of an arbitration will greatly depend on
41 Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 B.U.L. REv. 1039, 1040
(1983).
42 Id. at 1039.
43 Id. at 1040.
44 Id. at 1097; 2 MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH 205 (H.
Heinrichs ed. 1984); Judgment of February 8, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof, Neue Juristische Woehen-
schrift 1984, 1746, 1747.
45 Judgment of February 8, 1984, Btmdesgerichtshof, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1984,
1746.
46 Id. at 1747.
47 Id. at 1748.
48 Id.
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the particular issues disputed and on the particular law identified in the
contract as the applicable law.
2. Arbitration Procedure
A choice of law provision may also regulate the procedures used in
an arbitration.49 Usually, an agreement to arbitrate makes reference to
an institution's rules of arbitration and provides for their governance
over the hearings' procedures. These rules, however, often refer to "the
governing law" regarding whether an arbitrator may institute certain
procedures.50 Even if the arbitration agreement contains no reference to
an established set of rules, other applicable law may require the imple-
mentation of particular procedures by the arbitrator."1 Again, a refer-
ence to United States and German laws concerning arbitration
procedures demonstrates that the choice of law can have a significant
effect on the procedures used in an arbitration.
EXAMPLE (3): Bigco and Megacorp enter arbitration. At one
proceeding, Bigco presents a witness who damages Megacorp's case
greatly. Counsel for Megacorp therefore desires to cross-examine the
witness in order to discredit her testimony. Issue: Must the arbitrator
allow counsel to cross-examine the witness?
Depending upon which country's laws the arbitrator must apply, it
may or may not be required to allow cross-examination. In Germany,
arbitrators almost never allow cross-examination.52 In German trial pro-
ceedings, the judge conducts the examination of the witnesses.53 Like-
wise, arbitrators control the questioning during their proceedings.54
Given that arbitrators have discretion over the hearings' procedures ab-
sent expressed agreement by the parties55 and that German law has no
provision concerning cross-examination in an arbitration, the arbitrator
in Example (3), if bound by German law, would not have to allow parties
49 Branson & Wallace, supra note 10, at 45; Danilowicz, supra note 2, at 237.
50 See, e-g., COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIA-
TION, Rule 27 (oaths); Rule 30 (arbitration in absence of a party); Rule 31 (evidence); Rule 41 (time
of the award); Rule 42 (form of the award); Rule 45 (delivery of award to parties) (1984).
51 See Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 1205 (statutes such as the United States Arbitration Act may
serve as a source of arbitration procedure).
52 GLOSSNER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 17
(1984).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 17.
55 ZPO § 1034. However, parties to the arbitration may provide for cross-examination in their
agreement.
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to conduct cross-examination. 6
Many American jurisdictions take a contrary position. Although an
arbitrator in the United States may control cross-examination in order to
prevent harassment or intimidation of the witness, the arbitrator gener-
ally allows such examination. 7 Moreover, the Uniform Arbitration Act,
in force in twenty-six states, 8 provides that "parties are entitled.. .to
cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing." 9 Thus, an arbitrator
in Example (3) would be required to permit cross-examination if the
choice of law mandated the application of the Uniform Arbitration
Act.' These two approaches to the examination of witnesses show how
a choice of law provision can have a significant impact on an arbitration
hearing's procedure.
3. Agreement to Arbitrate
Parties to a transnational contract may designate their choice of law
to apply to the arbitration agreement itself as separate from the contract
in general.6 Courts may be required to settle certain types of issues con-
cerning the agreement to arbitrate under both German and United States
law.62 Regardless of the legal institution making the initial decision, the
choice of applicable law should influence the resolutions of disputes over
the validity and application of the arbitration agreement.63
EXAMPLE (4): Americorp and Deutschfirm conduct a transaction
whose characteristics place it outside the scope of both the Uniform
Commercial Code and the German Commercial Code. The parties agree
to resolve any future disputes arising from the transaction through arbi-
tration. This agreement is contained in a clause conspicuously printed
within the body of the main contract. Issue: Does a legally enforceable
agreement to arbitrate exist?
By this point, the reader should not be surprised that the answer to
this issue depends on the applicability of German or United States law.
On one hand, a German court would find that the agreement to arbitrate
56 GLOSSNER, The Federal Republic of Germany, in 1 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 12 (P. Sanders ed. 1984).
57 HOLTZMANN, The Unites States, in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION 18 (P. Sanders ed. 1984).
58 Id. at 2.
59 Uniform Arbitration Act § 5(b) (1987).
60 Id.
61 See Danilowicz, supra note 2, at 237.
62 For the United States, see United States Arbitration Act, infra note 136, at §§ 4 (validity),
10(d) (powers of arbitrator), l1(b) (scope); for the Federal Republic of Germany, see ZPO §§ 1026
(form), 1027 (form), 1045 (termination), 1046 (scope).
63 But see infra notes 142-60 and accompanying text.
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in Example (4) would be invalid. 64 The German Civil Code requires that
an agreement to arbitrate be in writing and contain no other agreements
(except relating to arbitration procedure). 6 Since the agreement in Ex-
ample (4) was not separate from the main contract, it would not be en-
forced under German law.66
If United States law governed, the arbitration agreement in Example
(4) would be valid.67 As in Germany, an agreement to arbitrate must be
in writing in order to be enforced.68 However, no courts or legislatures
in the United States have developed any further requirements concerning
the form of such an agreement.69 As a result, an otherwise valid arbitra-
tion clause embedded within a contract, such as the one in Example (4),
is enforceable if United States law applies. ° This difference in the two
nations' laws regarding arbitration agreements demonstrates how a
choice of law provision can be quite determinative in the effect of an
arbitration agreement.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the importance of a transna-
tional contract's choice of law provision. Not only can that choice influ-
ence the ultimate outcome of an arbitration, but it can also affect whether
certain procedures will be available to parties in the proceedings and -
whether such proceedings will even take place. By agreeing upon the law
that will apply to the substance of the contract, the arbitration proce-
dures, and the agreement to arbitrate, parties to a transnational contract
can have a significant impact on the resolution of conflicts between them.
B. Other Benefits of The Choice of Law
Although quite important, the ability to influence the outcome of
the dispute is not the sole benefit associated with an adequate choice of
law. Other considerations become apparent upon a broader examination
of the parties' interests in the overall transaction.
A significant advantage of a choice of law provision is that it pre-
vents the application of conflict of laws rules.71 Because no party can be
sure of which conflict rule will apply in the event of a dispute (unless the
64 ZPO § 1027.
65 Id
66 Id. If the German Commercial Code was applicable to the transaction, this limitation on the
form of the agreement would not apply. Id. at para. 2. Whether the Code governs depends upon,
among other things, whether both parties are considered "merchants" under the Code. See HGB
§§ 1-7.
67 See Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967).
68 U.S.A.A., infra note 137, at §§ 2 and 4; Uniform Arbitration Act § 1 (1987).
69 Holtzmann, supra note 57, at 4.
70 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401.
71 R.EDFEN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 94.
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forum is contractually set),72 uncertainty can be great. In addition, the
mere application of a nation's conflict of law provisions can be difficult
and time consuming in a judicial or arbitral setting.7" A choice of law
clause will eliminate these application expenses as long as it is accompa-
nied by an agreement to arbitrate.74
A choice of law provision may be usefid in its delineation of the
legal rules and parameters of the transaction prior to the development of
any dispute.7 With prior knowledge of the system or systems of applica-
ble law, parties can more readily determine what rules will govern a dis-
pute and what remedies may be available. As a result, the outcome of
dispute resolution may be more certain and predictable, and parties may
be more inclined to negotiate a settlement, thereby saving the expense of
arbitration.76 In this way, the choice of law may eliminate the need to
arbitrate altogether.
Finally, a choice of law clause may allow parties to choose the meth-
ods and remedies by which an arbitrator will resolve their disputes.77
For instance, parties to a contract may foresee the value of maintaining
good long-term relationships with each other. In order to minimize dis-
ruptions, they may wish to grant an arbitrator powers to reform a con-
tract in light of changed circumstances instead of excusing parties'
performance obligations. As noted above, a choice of German law would
grant the arbitrator such powers.78 In sum, parties gain many benefits
and advantages by negotiating a choice of law provision in transnational
contracts.
III. CHOICES IN THE CHOICE OF LAW
Adequate choices of law clearly decrease many of the risks and costs
associated with international commercial disputes. However, still at is-
sue are what constitutes an "adequate" choice of law and whether some
choices are better than others for a given contractual setting. Essentially,
parties to a transnational contract subject to international arbitration
have four types of options: a single international law; anational substan-
72 See ScOLEs & HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (1984) (Rules of conflicts law differ among
jurisdictions).
73 See id. at 4 (Resolution of conflict of laws issues involve balancing two objectives that are at
times opposing: individual justice and protection of societal interest).
74 As opposed to an arbitrator, a court may require that the choice of law bear some reasonable
relationship to the transaction. R sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.
75 DELAUME, supra note 10, at 4.
76 Id.; see Higgins, Brown and Roach, supra note 5, at 1041.
77 See Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 1194 (arbitration can be "custom-tailored to suit the parties'
needs and desires").
78 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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five rules; a single national system of law; and contractual depeqage.
This Section will examine the four types and determine which maximize
the advantages of a choice of law clause.
A. International Law
As international trade has grown at its rapid pace, the need for an
international system of commercial law has developed. In response to
this need, various international treaties and conventions have attempted
to set forth trade-facilitating legal rules.79 An examination of one such
agreement, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 0 will show that international treaties do not serve
as adequate choices of law by themselves.
The purpose of the CISG was "to set out basic rules to govern inter-
national commercial contracts in the absence of expressed contractual
provisions to the contrary.""1 After twelve years of work, 2 however, the
United Nations only created a document that is full of "indeterminate
rules"8 3 and that provides no "meaningful guidance in concrete
situations.""s
There are, as a result, numerous examples of provisions in the CISG
that offer mere vague and uncertain standards. For instance, certain
rules governing applicability of the CISG, such as the place of business
determination 5 and the definition of goods, 6 lend themselves to several
possible interpretations.87 References to various contract doctrines, in-
cluding excuse88 and good faith, 9 are also without any certain defini-
79 See, eg., New York Convention, supra note 17; United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, infra note 80.
80 Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONC. 97/19
(1980), reprinted in S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983) and 19 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIAL 668 (1980) [hereinafter CISG].
81 S. EXEc. REP. No. 20, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
82 Id.
83 Note, Unification and Certainty: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1984, 1989 (1984).
84 Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 265, 282 (1984).
85 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. I, para. 1; see Rosett, supra note 84, at 279; Note, Contracts for
the International Sale of Good. Applicability of the United Nations Convention, 69 IowA L. REv.
209, 220 (1983).
86 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. II; see Note, supra note 85, at 227.
87 Rosett, supra note 84, at 279 (place of business standard); Note, supra note 85, at 220 (place of
business standard) and 227 (definition of goods). For instance, a place of business under the CISG
could mean either the location of a party's primary business activity or simply a permanent foreign
office. Note, supra note 85, at 220.
88 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. LXXIX, para. 1; Note, supra note 83, at 1992.
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tion.9  Finally, the CISG provides no guidance as to when its
subjective9 1 or objective9 2 canon of interpretation applies.9 3 In sum, the
CISG creates too great a potential for conflicting interpretations of its
provisions.94
The CISG certainly has the advantage of being a neutral body of law
since it was thoroughly negotiated under the auspices of the United Na-
tions.95 Being such a negotiated instrument, however, the CISG resulted
in many compromises in order to accomodate the various legal systems
of its signators.96 Another drawback to the CISG is its limited scope.
The convention applies only to the commercial sale of goods97 and ex-
cludes contracts concerning distribution agreements9" or sale of serv-
ices.99 The CISG also does not apply to issues of validity, such as
unconscionability, mistake, duress, and fraud. 10° Thus, a contract that
selects the CISG as applicable law also requires another general body of
law to supplement it to avoid any gaps.
In sum, any contract that includes a choice of an international
agreement such as the CISG as its exclusive source of applicable law
would leave many legal issues to the discretion of the arbitrator, decrease
certainty and predictability in the resolution of the dispute, and prevent
the parties from enjoying most of the advantages of the choice of law.
B. Anational Substantive Rules
Another response to the growth in international commercial arbitra-
tion has been the develoment of anational substantive rules. 10 1 As the
name implies, parties attempt to designate as applicable law a group of
89 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. VII, para. 1; Rosett, supra note 84, at 289; Note, supra note 83,
at 1991.
90 Rosett, supra note 84, at 289 (good faith); Note, supra note 83, at 1991 (good faith) and 1992
(excuse). For instance, "good faith" may have different connotations depending upon which juris-
diction's definition one uses. Rosett, supra, at 290.
91 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. VIII, para. 1.
92 CISG, supra note 80, at Art VIII, para. 2.
93 Rosett, supra note 84, at 288.
94 It has been contended that these problems could be reduced if courts used foreign decisions to
help with their own interpretation and application of CISG terms. Note, The Need for Unifonn
Interpretation of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 50 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 197, 199 (1988).
95 S. ExEc. REP. No. 20, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
96 Rosett, supra note 84, at 282; Note, supra note 83, at 1989.
97 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. II.
98 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. I; Int'l Trade Rep., May 20, 1987, at 678, col. 1.
99 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. III, para. 2.
100 CISG, supra note 80, at Art. IV; Rosett, supra note 84, at 280; Int'l Trade Rep., May 20,
1987, at 68, col. 1.
101 Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. Rav. 629, 629 (1989).
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rules that are isolated from the influences of individual countries' laws. 0 2
Due to their lack of attachment to specific national systems, anational
substantive rules supposedly serve as a neutral source of governing
law.103 These rules also may be better suited than national laws to han-
dle certain issues that are exclusively international in nature."° Parties
to a contract additionally select anational substantive rules because they
may serve as a reasonable compromise when the parties are unable to
agree upon any other general source of law. 105 These benefits may pro-
vide a legitimate basis for the election of anational substantive rules as a
choice of law.
More often, however, the lack of clear definition renders these rules
inadequate for the choice of law. 'I The two primary forms of anational
substantive rules, the general principles of law'0 7 and the lex mer-
catoria05 , demonstrate this defect. The phrase "general principles of
law" has its origins in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice."o Although widely used in international commercial con-
tracts,110 the general principles have escaped any definite formulation in
international law or academic circles upon which parties can rely when
choosing governing law."' The lex mercatoria, a modern version of the
international law merchant," 2 also suffers from a lack of consistent, spe-
cific sources" 3' although it is recognized generally as being a combination
of general principles of law and customs of trade. 1 4 In sum, neither
system offers any clear, definitive rules to apply to international commer-
cial disputes.
Because of this lack of definition, the choice of either the general
principles of law or the lex mercatoria greatly eliminates benefits that the
102 See id.
103 Note, supra note 2, at 1816.
104 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 77; Note, supra note 2, at 1820.
105 Note, supra note 2, at 1816.
106 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 86.
107 See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 85; Note, supra note 2, at 1819.
108 See Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex
Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REv. 575, 576 (1989); Highet, The Enigma ofthe Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 613, 613 (1989); Note, supra note 2, at 1819.
109 See Note, supra note 2, at 1819 n.16.
110 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 84.
111 See Note, supra note 2, at 1819; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 86 (both describing
the vagueness of general principles of law).
112 Highet, supra note 108, at 617; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 89. The lex mercatoria
is the "system of laws which is adopted by all commercial nations, and constitutes the law of the
land." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 821 (5th ed. 1979).
113 Highet, supra note 108, at 623; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 91.
114 Danilowicz, supra note 2, at 273.
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choice of law gives parties.11 5 Without the benefit of clear, definite state-
ments of the law, arbitrators essentially apply such choices of law by
determining de novo what the rules require for each separate dispute.
The results of arbitration thus become unpredictable,116 eradicating the
outcome-determinative117 and the dispute reducing11 qualities of choice
of law. Parties governed by such a choice also do not have any control
over the methods and remedies implemented during the proceedings
since these rules give the arbitrator a practically unbridled discretion in
these areas. In this way, the choice of either anational substantive rule
system defeats the purpose of the choice of law in transnational business
contracts.
C. National Systems Of Law
In spite of the growing trend of using international rules, most
transnational contracts that include a choice of law provision make use
of a single national 119 system of law. 120 There are several strong reasons
for such a choice. A national system is a complete general body of law
that provides solutions for most every legal issue. 121 In addition, parties
and arbitrators alike can determine more easily the rules applicable to a
given situation when a national, rather than an international, legal sys-
tem applies. 122 The choice of a national law may also be the only selec-
tion recognized and enforced in some international arbitral fora.121
Consequently, a choice of a particular national set of laws provides cer-
tainty in dispute resolution.
However, such a choice creates certain disadvantages that parties
may find significant. One such problem is the potential loss of neutrality
since a law specifically designed by the chosen nation to aid one party
may control the outcome of the arbitration. 4 A national system also
may lack sufficient sophistication to handle certain issues found only in
115 See Higgins, Brown and Roach, supra note 5, at 1041 (vague and uncertain standards decrease
ability of parties to assess their positions and negotiate a settlement).
116 Note, supra note 2, at 1819.
117 Id.
118 See Higgins, Brown and Roach, supra note 5, at 1041.
119 See supra note 18.
120 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 76.
121 Id.; see Danilowicz, supra note 2, at 274 (reference to national law regarding certain problems
such as periods of proscription is necessary where anational or international laws do not cover the
issues).
122 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 76; see Note, supra note 2, at 1819 (general principles
of law can be vague and unpredictable).
123 Park, National Law and Commercial Justice" Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in Interna-
tional Arbitration, 63 TuL. L. Rnv. 647, 666-7 (1989). 1
124 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 78; Note, supra note 2, at 1820.
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an international or complex business setting. 125 In such a situation, an
arbitrator may resolve the dispute in a way that the parties neither fore-
saw nor desired. Finally, confining the applicable law to one national
system necessarily prevents parties from taking advantage of dispute res-
olution methods and principles present in other systems of law that may
be useful in their particular transaction. Therefore, a choice of one na-
tion's set of laws may be inadequate and inappropriate under certain
circumstances.
D. Contractual Depeqage
As revealed above, each of the three types of choice of law options
has significant drawbacks that may make each individually inadequate
for a given international transaction as a choice of law. However, a com-
bination of any or all of thee options may eliminate the insufficiency. By
employing the principle of depegage within a choice of law provision,
parties to a transnational contract can agree to apply certain areas of the
various systems of law to delineate potential issues or parts of the
transaction.
126
The implementation of contractual depegage involves a three-step
process. First, through a comparative analysis, the parties must identify
the principles and methods of the potentially applicable national legal
systems that would be most advantageous to them in the particular trans-
action. Categories of system characteristics that may benefit parties in-
clude opportunities to attack the contract's validity (such as formal
contract requirements, unconscionability, and duress), legal rules and de-
vices of interpretation, performance requirements, and remedial princi-
ples and methods.
The next step for the parties is to decide which legal system should
govern the different potential areas of dispute. Possible categories in-
dlude the substantive contractual issues, the arbitration procedural is-
sues, and issues concerning the arbitration agteement itself. In addition,
the parties can determine whether to assign sets of laws to specific types
of substantive issues, such as contractual validity, interpretation, and
performance, or to certain relationships within multiparty contract. 27
A final evaluation would be useful as to whether a general body of
international or anational law should supplement the systems selected
above. At this stage, the parties should consider whether their particular
transaction may develop problems that national systems of law cannot
125 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 77; Note, supra note 2, at 1820.
126 DELAUME, supra note 10, at 9.
127 Id. at 10.
Choice of Law Provisions in Int'l Commercial Arbitration
12:163(1991)
presently handle and whether the uncertainty of an arbitrator's decision
based upon the supplemental system would be too great.
Contractual depegage creates many benefits that the other choice of
law options cannot provide by themselves. Depeqage allows parties to
take full advantage of their autonomy over the choice of law and tailor
the rules to their greatest advantage. It retains, for the most part, the
certainty and determinability of the single national system option. Un-
less unequal bargaining power exists, depeqage will also result in a neu-
tral body of law. Further, this method may allow the resolution of some
choice of law negotiation barriers: objection aspects of certain legal sys-
tems may be contractually excluded. Finally, the agreed system will
most likely be able to handle any conflict issue that may arise.
Unfortunately, two significant disadvantages burden the method of
contractual depeqage. A principal difficulty is the high negotiation cost
associated with the process. To implement this choice of law option, the
parties' legal counsel must possess comparative law skills that are
scarce.128 The attorney must be fairly familiar with the variety of poten-
tial applicable systems of law in order to determine which ones should be
selected.129 In addition, parties will have to expend much time and effort
in ascertaining what the legal needs of their transaction are and which
systems best meet those needs. Although significant, these costs may de-
crease significantly as attorneys become accustomed to the process and
become knowledgeable and experienced with the more common contract
requirements.
A second problem with contractual depeqage arises in the applica-
tion of multiple systems of law. Under the depeqage approach, an arbi-
trator may need to classify a given issue in order to determine which law
governs. It is conceivable that an issue may not clearly fit into a particu-
lar category. The classic example of this problem is the classification of a
statute of limitations as procedural or substantive law. 130 Statutes of lim-
itations are generally considered to be matters of procedure.13 1 However,
in situations where the statute bars not merely the remedy for the cause
of action but the cause of action itself, it is considered to be substantive
law. 132 The determination of applicable law may consequently rest upon
128 Id. at 11; see Delaume, supra note 108, at 578 (attorney should know and review the laws of
each potentially applicable legal system).
129 Delaume, supra note 108, at 578.
130 SCOLES & HAY, supra note 72, at 59.
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142; Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
265 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1972); Cuthbertson v. Uhley, 509 F.2d 225, 226 (8th Cir. 1975).
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143; Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co.
v. Allied Chem. Corp., 467 F.2d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the determination of whether the statute of limitations limits the rights or
the remedies of the parties. Thus, this aspect of depegage may undercut
the goal of certainty and predictability in the choice of law.
In sum, contractual depegage may not always be a viable alternative
for parties to a transactional contract subject to arbitration. Nonetheless,
if the parties' counsel are experienced or if the type of transaction re-
quires highly structured and predictable dispute resolution, this method
of choice of law may be the best option.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE AND NONINTERFERENCE WITH
CHOICE OF LAW
In theory, parties to a transnational commercial agreement have a
variety of options in their choice of law to influence the outcome of dis-
putes. Governmental intrusion, however, severely curtails this exercise
of control and autonomy. Judicial institutions may intervene at several
points in the course of an arbitrable dispute and alter its outcome, in
spite of the choice of law.133 The following examination of applicable
United States law 3 ' will demonstrate how national courts may act to
thwart the original goals of the parties and change the form and sub-
stance of arbitration proceedings.
Since transactions underlying international commercial arbitrations
involve, by definition, "commerce among the several States or with for-
eign nations,"' 35 the United States Arbitration Act'36 and the federal
substantive law created by the U.S.A.A. 137 are the sources of applicable
133 DELAumE, Court Intervention in Arbitral Proceedings, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL Dis-
PUTEs THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBIRATION 196 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1982). Judicial interfer-
ence does not occur if the arbitration takes place under the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. Id. However,
there have been very few of this type of proceedings. See id. at 196 n.3.
134 This analysis could include applicable German law as well. However, such an examination
seems unnecessary in light of the similarity of the modes of judicial review in the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany. For instance, both countries allow attacks on the validity and
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate based on principles of contract. Compare GLOSSNER, supra
note 52, at 8-9 (Federal Republic of Germany) with infra notes 142-60 and accompanying text
(United States). Additionally, both German and United States courts may set aside an award if
varying standards of procedural fairness or public policy are violated. Compare ZPO § 1041 (Fed-
eral Republic of Germany) with infra notes 161-80 and accompanying text (United States). Finally,
both nations are parties to the New York Convention, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft v.
Overseas Motors, Inc., 418 F.Supp. 982, 983 (E.D. Mich. 1976), and therefore share the same stan-
dards of review for nondomestic awards.
135 U.S.A.A., infra note 137, at § 1.
136 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1988) [hereinafter U.S.A.A.].
137 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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law for review of such arbitrations by United States courts.138 In addi-
tion, the fact that international arbitrations necessarily involve legal rela-
tionships not solely between citizens of the United States requires that
the United States judiciary also apply the New York Convention to such
reviews.139 Courts must therefore impose both the U.S.A.A. and the
New York Convention as standards of review for transnational commer-
cial arbitrations.
Both standards may be divided into two groups of rules based upon
the stage the arbitration has reached. If confronting an uncooperative
adverse party, a party may need to request judicial assistance either to
enforce an agreement to arbitrate (pre-arbitration review) or to enforce
an arbitration award (post-arbitration review).140 Both the U.S.A.A. and
the New York Convention differentiate between these two types of judi-
cial intervention and require different modes of review.
A. Pre-Arbitration Review
Pre-arbitration review occurs, as noted above, when one party ap-
peals to a national court in order to enforce its agreement to arbitrate
with another party. In this case, the party makes use of the coercive
power of the state to force the uncooperative party to participate in the
arbitration proceedings.141
The U.S.A.A. and the New York Convention provide for similar
pre-arbitration review standards. Under the U.S.A.A., a court must di-
rect the parties to arbitration unless there are issues regarding the mak-
ing or the performance of the arbitration agreement.1 "2 In order to
defend itself against a motion to compel arbitration, a party may attack
the validity, 143 enforceability,144 or scope145 of the agreement to arbitrate.
Along similar lines, the New York Convention requires that a court
"refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the [arbitration]
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
138 Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir.
1978).
139 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1988); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982).
140 DELAUME, supra note 133, at 196. A party may also need judicial intervention concurrent
with the arbitral proceedings, see id. at 206, but such review does not affect the influence of the
arbitration agreement's choice of law.
141 See U.S.A.A., supra note 136, at § 4 (proceedings to compel arbitration) and § 3 (action to
stay judicial proceedings during arbitration).
142 U.S.A.A., supra note 136, at § 4; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 (1967).
143 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985).
144 Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987); see Mitsubishi
Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
145 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 626; Becker, 585 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1978).
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formed."'" Essentially, this review of the agreement parallels that under
the U.S.A.A. 147 Thus, United States courts require a showing of some
defect in the agreement to arbitrate before they deny a motion to compel
arbitration.
Judicial intervention of this type does not necessarily limit the effect
of the agreement's choice of law clause. In theory, it should make no
difference whether an arbitrator or a judge applies the law provided for in
the agreement. Both would impose the same rules to the same factual
situation and arrive at the same conclusion.
The difficulties arise when the courts use a law different from that in
the choice of law clause. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp.,'48 the United States Supreme Court held that the
U.S.A.A. had, in effect, "create[d] a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage
of the Act." 14 9 Because of this mandate, and because the New York
Convention did not specify which nation's laws should apply in such re-
views, United States courts apply this substantive law to agreements cov-
ered by the New York Convention as well.15
In fact, an agreement's choice of law provision may not prevent the
employment of federal law to the review. 5 The courts in the United
States ignore the choice of law in these situations primarily because fed-
eral law preempts any other law that may be applicable'52 and because
the issue of an arbitration agreement's enforceability falls within the law
of remedies, over which the law of the forum usually governs.
15 3
A clear example as to how such a standard of review can frustrate
parties' intentions is Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradi-
owerk GmbH.154 In that case, the two litigants had entered an agreement
146 New York Convention, supra note 17, at Art. H1(3).
147 See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (review under both U.S.A.A. and New York Conven-
tion); compare Rhone Mediterrane Compaignia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazoni v. Lauro,
712 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1983) (review under New York Convention alone) with Genesco, 815 F.2d
at 844 (review under U.S.A.A. alone).
148 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
149 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). In reviewing such agreements, courts must apply general princi-
ples of contract law as the federal substantive law. Genesco, 815 F.2d at 845.
150 Becker, 585 F.2d at 43; see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 626 (on the basis of the New
York Convention and the U.S.A.A., court refers to federal substantive law in determining the en-
forceability of an arbitration agreement).
151 Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 1986); Becker, 585 F.2d at 43;
Matter of Ferrara, 441 F. Supp. 778, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
152 See Becker, 585 F.2d at 43.
153 Ferrara, 441 F. Supp. at 781 n.2.
154 585 F.2d 39 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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to arbitrate all disputes arising from their contract."'5 The choice of law
clause provided that German law would govern the agreement,15 6 and
one party argued that the court should apply German law in resolving
the dispute over what issues the arbitrator could resolve."i 7 The court
refused and instead applied United States federal substantive law to re-
solve the issue. 5 ' By applying a law different from that in the contract,
the court may have produced an outcome that neither side had foreseen
or originally desired.15 9 Consequently, the intervention of United States
courts in pre-arbitration disputes may serve to defeat parties' original
expectations and diminish any benefits of certainty and predictability
that a choice of law provision may have created.
B. Post-Arbitration Review
Similar problems with the enforcement of choice of law provisions
develop during post-arbitration review. At this stage, the party victori-
ous at the arbitration proceedings might enlist judicial assistance in en-
forcing the arbitrator's award. 1" However, the standards of review that
Unites States courts use may limit the effectiveness of the arbitration
agreement's choice of law.
Both the U.S.A.A. and the New York Convention afford limited
bases for refusals to enforce arbitration awards. 1 ' Under the U.S.A.A.,
a court may vacate the award upon proof that one of the conditions enu-
merated in 9 U.S.C. § 10 was met,162 the arbitrator demonstrated a
155 Id. at 42.
156 Id. at 42 n.3.
157 Id. at 43.
158 Id.
159 As shown in the text accompanying supra notes 19-48, the application of another jurisdic-
tion's law to the same contract may lead to a completely opposite resolution of a dispute.
160 DELAUME, supra note 133, at 196.
161 Sidarma Societa Italiana di Armamento Spa, Venice v. Holt Marine Industries, Inc., 515 F.
Supp. 1302, 1306 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981) (U.S.A.A.); Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societi General de L'industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir.
1974) (New York Convention).
162 Smigma v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1985); Sidarma, 515 F.
Supp. at 1306. 9 U.S.C. § 10 provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mu-
tual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made....
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"manifest disregard" of the law, 16 3 or the award compels a violation of
the law or is contrary to public policy.16" Similarly, defenses to the en-
forcement of an award under the New York Convention are limited to
those set forth in Article V, 165 including violation of public policy.
166
The two sets of standards of review overlap to some extent, 167 and the
U.S.A.A. provisions apply to those awards governed by the New York
Convention except to the extent that the U.S.A.A. may conflict with the
Convention."16
The two major areas of review in which United States courts may
interfere with the functioning of a choice of law provision are the scope
of the arbitrator's powers and the conformity with public policy. When
determining whether an arbitrator exceeded his powers in issuing an
award, courts apply federal common law in construing what powers the
arbitration agreement granted. 1 69 Such is the case even if the arbitration
163 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436-7 (1953); French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986).
16 4 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983); Diapluse Corp. of America v. Carba, Ltd.,
626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980).
165 Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 973. Article V of the New York Convention, supra note
17, provides:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement.. .were, under the law applicable to them, under some inca-
pacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appoint-
ment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of
the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the sub-
mission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contain decisions on mat-
ters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the
law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.
166 New York Convention, supra note 17, at Art. V(2)(b).
167 Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 1983).
168 Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 973.
169 Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, 882 F.2d 6, 11 n.5 (Ist Cir. 1989).
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agreement included a choice of law clause. 7°
For example, the plaintiff in Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, In
argued that the arbitrator exceeded its powers when granting defendant
punitive damages because New York law, the law selected in the arbitra-
tion agreement, prohibited punitive damages in arbitral awards.' 72 Hold-
ing that under the U.S.A.A. federal law governed regardless of the choice
of law, the court allowed the award of punitive damages.'73 If the parties
initially had chosen New York law in part because of its restriction on
punitive damages, such rules of review would have defeated the expecta-
tions of the parties, thereby eliminating one advantage of the choice of
law.
The public policy evaluation of arbitration awards similarly deterio-
rates the choice of law's benefits. Courts may deny enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award if it would violate United States public policy.' 7 4
"Such a public policy.. .must be well defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents .... ' "175 Es-
sentially, the arbitrator's award must create an explicit conflict with stat-
utory or case law.
176
Example (1) in Part I of this Comment well illustrates how this pub-
lic policy review would thwart the aims of an agreement's choice of law.
As noted above, if the arbitrator applied German law to the example's
fact scenario, he would have upheld the penalty provision of the contract
and granted an award accordingly. 17 7  However, both statutes and case
law in the United States hold such penalties to be illegal and against
public policy. 17s In such a case, it is unlikely that a United States court
would enforce such an award in spite of the parties' intentions to create a
penalty valid under German law.
179
As this analysis demonstrates, the intervention of United States
courts diminishes the role of the choice of law in an arbitration agree-
170 Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 12; Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (1lth
Cir. 1988).
171 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
172 Id. at 1387.
173 Id.
174 Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., Inc. v. Int'l Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 152 (2d Cir.
1984); Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974.
175 W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1979)).
176 United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987).
177 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
179 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America AFL-CIO, Local
Union 540 v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1983) (court refuses enforcement
of award that would violate statutory and case law).
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ment, thereby destroying the value that the choice initially created for
the parties. By applying its own forum's law, national courts effectively
limit the extent to which the chosen law influences the operation and
outcomes of international commercial arbitrations.
V. CONCLUSION
The choice of law in transnational contracts can have a significant
effect on the resolution of conflicts through international commercial ar-
bitration. Through their choice, parties have the potential to influence
the outcome of their disputes, the types of procedures that an arbitration
utilizes, and even the type of institution that will eventually resolve the
disputes. An arbitration clause may name a set of anational substantive
rules or a single national or international system of law. However, these
various systems may be combined through contractual depegage in order
to make the arbitration as predictable, neutral, and complete as possible
while allowing parties to enjoy only the most advantageous aspects of the
different systems of law.
Unfortunately, national governments pose a significant obstacle to
the realization of these advantages. Through pre-arbitration and post-
arbitration review, courts may force arbitrators to conform the operation
of proceedings and their subsequent awards to a particular set of laws,
regardless of the parties' explicit choice of law. As long as national judi-
cial institutions refuse to apply the law selected by the parties, the advan-
tages of contractual depegage may never be fully realized.
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